China vs. North Korea
Economy
China | North Korea | |
---|---|---|
Economy - overview | Since the late 1970s, China has moved from a closed, centrally planned system to a more market-oriented one that plays a major global role. China has implemented reforms in a gradualist fashion, resulting in efficiency gains that have contributed to a more than tenfold increase in GDP since 1978. Reforms began with the phaseout of collectivized agriculture, and expanded to include the gradual liberalization of prices, fiscal decentralization, increased autonomy for state enterprises, growth of the private sector, development of stock markets and a modern banking system, and opening to foreign trade and investment. China continues to pursue an industrial policy, state support of key sectors, and a restrictive investment regime. From 2013 to 2017, China had one of the fastest growing economies in the world, averaging slightly more than 7% real growth per year. Measured on a purchasing power parity (PPP) basis that adjusts for price differences, China in 2017 stood as the largest economy in the world, surpassing the US in 2014 for the first time in modern history. China became the world's largest exporter in 2010, and the largest trading nation in 2013. Still, China's per capita income is below the world average. In July 2005 moved to an exchange rate system that references a basket of currencies. From mid-2005 to late 2008, the renminbi (RMB) appreciated more than 20% against the US dollar, but the exchange rate remained virtually pegged to the dollar from the onset of the global financial crisis until June 2010, when Beijing announced it would resume a gradual appreciation. From 2013 until early 2015, the renminbi held steady against the dollar, but it depreciated 13% from mid-2015 until end-2016 amid strong capital outflows; in 2017 the RMB resumed appreciating against the dollar - roughly 7% from end-of-2016 to end-of-2017. In 2015, the People's Bank of China announced it would continue to carefully push for full convertibility of the renminbi, after the currency was accepted as part of the IMF's special drawing rights basket. However, since late 2015 the Chinese Government has strengthened capital controls and oversight of overseas investments to better manage the exchange rate and maintain financial stability. The Chinese Government faces numerous economic challenges including: (a) reducing its high domestic savings rate and correspondingly low domestic household consumption; (b) managing its high corporate debt burden to maintain financial stability; (c) controlling off-balance sheet local government debt used to finance infrastructure stimulus; (d) facilitating higher-wage job opportunities for the aspiring middle class, including rural migrants and college graduates, while maintaining competitiveness; (e) dampening speculative investment in the real estate sector without sharply slowing the economy; (f) reducing industrial overcapacity; and (g) raising productivity growth rates through the more efficient allocation of capital and state-support for innovation. Economic development has progressed further in coastal provinces than in the interior, and by 2016 more than 169.3 million migrant workers and their dependents had relocated to urban areas to find work. One consequence of China's population control policy known as the "one-child policy" - which was relaxed in 2016 to permit all families to have two children - is that China is now one of the most rapidly aging countries in the world. Deterioration in the environment - notably air pollution, soil erosion, and the steady fall of the water table, especially in the North - is another long-term problem. China continues to lose arable land because of erosion and urbanization. The Chinese Government is seeking to add energy production capacity from sources other than coal and oil, focusing on natural gas, nuclear, and clean energy development. In 2016, China ratified the Paris Agreement, a multilateral agreement to combat climate change, and committed to peak its carbon dioxide emissions between 2025 and 2030. The government's 13th Five-Year Plan, unveiled in March 2016, emphasizes the need to increase innovation and boost domestic consumption to make the economy less dependent on government investment, exports, and heavy industry. However, China has made more progress on subsidizing innovation than rebalancing the economy. Beijing has committed to giving the market a more decisive role in allocating resources, but the Chinese Government's policies continue to favor state-owned enterprises and emphasize stability. Chinese leaders in 2010 pledged to double China's GDP by 2020, and the 13th Five Year Plan includes annual economic growth targets of at least 6.5% through 2020 to achieve that goal. In recent years, China has renewed its support for state-owned enterprises in sectors considered important to "economic security," explicitly looking to foster globally competitive industries. Chinese leaders also have undermined some market-oriented reforms by reaffirming the "dominant" role of the state in the economy, a stance that threatens to discourage private initiative and make the economy less efficient over time. The slight acceleration in economic growth in 2017-the first such uptick since 2010-gives Beijing more latitude to pursue its economic reforms, focusing on financial sector deleveraging and its Supply-Side Structural Reform agenda, first announced in late 2015. | North Korea, one of the world's most centrally directed and least open economies, faces chronic economic problems. Industrial capital stock is nearly beyond repair as a result of decades of mismanagement, underinvestment, shortages of spare parts, and poor maintenance. Corruption and resource misallocation, including show projects, large-scale military spending, and development of its ballistic missile and nuclear programs, severely draws off resources needed for investment and civilian consumption. Industrial and power outputs have stagnated for years at a fraction of pre-1990 levels. Frequent weather-related crop failures aggravated chronic food shortages caused by on-going systemic problems, including a lack of arable land, collective farming practices, poor soil quality, insufficient fertilization, and persistent shortages of tractors and fuel.
The mid 1990s through mid-2000s were marked by severe famine and widespread starvation. Significant food aid was provided by the international community through 2009. Since that time, food assistance has declined significantly. In the last few years, domestic corn and rice production has improved, although domestic production does not fully satisfy demand. A large portion of the population continues to suffer from prolonged malnutrition and poor living conditions. Since 2002, the government has allowed semi-private markets to begin selling a wider range of goods, allowing North Koreans to partially make up for diminished public distribution system rations. It also implemented changes in the management process of communal farms in an effort to boost agricultural output.
In December 2009, North Korea carried out a redenomination of its currency, capping the amount of North Korean won that could be exchanged for the new notes, and limiting the exchange to a one-week window. A concurrent crackdown on markets and foreign currency use yielded severe shortages and inflation, forcing Pyongyang to ease the restrictions by February 2010. In response to the sinking of the South Korean warship Cheonan and the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island in 2010, South Korea's government cut off most aid, trade, and bilateral cooperation activities. In February 2016, South Korea ceased its remaining bilateral economic activity by closing the Kaesong Industrial Complex in response to North Korea's fourth nuclear test a month earlier. This nuclear test and another in September 2016 resulted in two United Nations Security Council Resolutions that targeted North Korea's foreign currency earnings, particularly coal and other mineral exports. Throughout 2017, North Korea's continued nuclear and missile tests led to a tightening of UN sanctions, resulting in full sectoral bans on DPRK exports and drastically limited key imports. Over the last decade, China has been North Korea's primary trading partner.
The North Korean Government continues to stress its goal of improving the overall standard of living, but has taken few steps to make that goal a reality for its populace. In 2016, the regime used two mass mobilizations - one totaling 70 days and another 200 days - to spur the population to increase production and complete construction projects quickly. The regime released a five-year economic development strategy in May 2016 that outlined plans for promoting growth across sectors. Firm political control remains the government's overriding concern, which likely will inhibit formal changes to North Korea's current economic system. |
GDP (purchasing power parity) | $22,526,502,000,000 (2019 est.) $21,229,363,000,000 (2018 est.) $19,887,033,000,000 (2017 est.) note: data are in 2010 dollars | $40 billion (2015 est.) $40 billion (2014 est.) $40 billion (2013 est.) note: data are in 2015 US dollars North Korea does not publish reliable National Income Accounts data; the data shown are derived from purchasing power parity (PPP) GDP estimates that were made by Angus MADDISON in a study conducted for the OECD; his figure for 1999 was extrapolated to 2015 using estimated real growth rates for North Korea's GDP and an inflation factor based on the US GDP deflator; the results were rounded to the nearest $10 billion. |
GDP - real growth rate | 6.14% (2019 est.) 6.75% (2018 est.) 6.92% (2017 est.) | -1.1% (2015 est.) 1% (2014 est.) 1.1% (2013 est.) |
GDP - per capita (PPP) | $16,117 (2019 est.) $15,243 (2018 est.) $14,344 (2017 est.) note: data are in 2010 dollars | $1,700 (2015 est.) $1,800 (2014 est.) $1,800 (2013 est.) note: data are in 2015 US dollars |
GDP - composition by sector | agriculture: 7.9% (2017 est.) industry: 40.5% (2017 est.) services: 51.6% (2017 est.) | agriculture: 22.5% (2017 est.) industry: 47.6% (2017 est.) services: 29.9% (2017 est.) |
Population below poverty line | 0.6% (2019 est.) | NA |
Household income or consumption by percentage share | lowest 10%: 2.1% highest 10%: 31.4% (2012) note: data are for urban households only | lowest 10%: NA highest 10%: NA |
Inflation rate (consumer prices) | 2.8% (2019 est.) 2% (2018 est.) 1.5% (2017 est.) | NA |
Labor force | 774.71 million (2019 est.) note: by the end of 2012, China's working age population (15-64 years) was 1.004 billion | 14 million (2014 est.) note: estimates vary widely |
Labor force - by occupation | agriculture: 27.7% industry: 28.8% services: 43.5% (2016 est.) | agriculture: 37% industry: 63% (2008 est.) |
Unemployment rate | 3.64% (2019 est.) 3.84% (2018 est.) note: data are for registered urban unemployment, which excludes private enterprises and migrants | 25.6% (2013 est.) 25.5% (2012 est.) |
Budget | revenues: 2.553 trillion (2017 est.) expenditures: 3.008 trillion (2017 est.) | revenues: 3.2 billion (2007 est.) expenditures: 3.3 billion (2007 est.) |
Industries | world leader in gross value of industrial output; mining and ore processing, iron, steel, aluminum, and other metals, coal; machine building; armaments; textiles and apparel; petroleum; cement; chemicals; fertilizer; consumer products (including footwear, toys, and electronics); food processing; transportation equipment, including automobiles, railcars and locomotives, ships, aircraft; telecommunications equipment, commercial space launch vehicles, satellites | military products; machine building, electric power, chemicals; mining (coal, iron ore, limestone, magnesite, graphite, copper, zinc, lead, and precious metals), metallurgy; textiles, food processing; tourism |
Industrial production growth rate | 6.1% (2017 est.) | 1% (2017 est.) |
Agriculture - products | maize, rice, vegetables, wheat, sugar cane, potatoes, cucumbers, tomatoes, watermelons, sweet potatoes | rice, maize, vegetables, apples, potatoes, cabbages, fruit, sweet potatoes, beans, soybeans |
Exports | $2.49 trillion (2018) $2.216 trillion (2017 est.) $1.99 trillion (2016 est.) | $222 million (2018) $4.582 billion (2017 est.) $2.908 billion (2015 est.) |
Exports - commodities | broadcasting equipment, computers, integrated circuits, office machinery and parts, telephones (2019) | watch components, fake hair, iron alloys, instructional models, tungsten (2019) |
Exports - partners | United States 17%, Hong Kong 10%, Japan 6% (2019) | China 67%, Suriname 6% (2019) |
Imports | $2.14 trillion (2018) $1.74 trillion (2017 est.) $1.501 trillion (2016 est.) | $2.32 billion (2018 est.) $3.86 billion (2016 est.) |
Imports - commodities | crude petroleum, integrated circuits, iron, natural gas, cars, gold (2019) | clothing and apparel, soybean oil, rice, wheat products, clocks/watches (2019) |
Imports - partners | South Korea 9%, Japan 8%, Australia 7%, Germany 7%, US 7%, Taiwan 6% (2019) | China 96% (2019) |
Debt - external | $2,027,950,000,000 (2019 est.) $1,935,206,000,000 (2018 est.) | $5 billion (2013 est.) |
Exchange rates | Renminbi yuan (RMB) per US dollar - 6.5374 (2020 est.) 7.0403 (2019 est.) 6.8798 (2018 est.) 6.1434 (2014 est.) 6.1958 (2013 est.) | North Korean won (KPW) per US dollar (average market rate) 135 (2017 est.) 130 (2016 est.) 130 (2015 est.) 98.5 (2013 est.) 155.5 (2012 est.) |
Fiscal year | calendar year | calendar year |
GDP (official exchange rate) | $14,327,359,000,000 (2019 est.) note: because China's exchange rate is determined by fiat rather than by market forces, the official exchange rate measure of GDP is not an accurate measure of China's output; GDP at the official exchange rate substantially understates the actual level of China's output vis-a-vis the rest of the world; in China's situation, GDP at purchasing power parity provides the best measure for comparing output across countries | $28 billion (2013 est.) |
Taxes and other revenues | 21.3% (of GDP) (2017 est.) | 11.4% (of GDP) (2007 est.) note: excludes earnings from state-operated enterprises |
Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-) | -3.8% (of GDP) (2017 est.) | -0.4% (of GDP) (2007 est.) |
GDP - composition, by end use | household consumption: 39.1% (2017 est.) government consumption: 14.5% (2017 est.) investment in fixed capital: 42.7% (2017 est.) investment in inventories: 1.7% (2017 est.) exports of goods and services: 20.4% (2017 est.) imports of goods and services: -18.4% (2017 est.) | household consumption: NA (2014 est.) government consumption: NA (2014 est.) investment in fixed capital: NA (2014 est.) investment in inventories: NA (2014 est.) exports of goods and services: 5.9% (2016 est.) imports of goods and services: -11.1% (2016 est.) |
Gross national saving | 44.2% of GDP (2019 est.) 44.4% of GDP (2018 est.) 45% of GDP (2017 est.) | NA |
Source: CIA Factbook